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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4406 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARK GREEN, 
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-08-cr-00044-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 21, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 28, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION
*
 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                            
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant Mark Green appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion 
for return of property under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s order for abuse 
of discretion.  United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings.   
 In November 2009, a jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found Green 
guilty of several offenses relating to access-device fraud and identity theft.  The District 
Court sentenced him to 139 months’ imprisonment and ordered the forfeiture of his 
Mercedes-Benz and $9,000.  United States v. Green, 516 F. App’x 113, 117 (3d Cir. 
2013).  This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.  Id. 
 In the District Court, Green filed a counseled motion under Rule 41(g), seeking 
the return of two computers, a 2007 Dodge Charger, $4,000 in cash, personal papers, 
keys, printers, office equipment, a word processor, a typewriter, a driver’s license, a fax 
machine, a copy machine, credit cards, and clothes.  In response, the Government 
asserted that it did not oppose “the return of any of the items of a non-criminal nature.”  
However, the Government maintained that all items that had been seized from Green’s 
apartment had been transferred to the United States Secret Service, that the 2007 Dodge 
Charger had been conveyed to the lien holder, and that it had never seized clothing or 
cash.    
 The District Court denied Green’s motion without an evidentiary hearing.  The 
Court accepted the Government’s representation that it had “either returned to Green the 
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items to which he was entitled, transferred the items to the Secret Service, or never 
possessed the items in the first place.”  Green then filed a timely notice of appeal to this 
Court.  
 On appeal, Green argues primarily that the District Court erred in denying his 
motion without holding a hearing or calling for additional evidence.  The Government, 
exhibiting commendable candor, agrees.  We likewise agree.   
 As we explained in Chambers, after the termination of criminal proceedings, “the 
person from whom the property was seized is presumed to have a right to its return, and 
the government must demonstrate that it has a legitimate reason to retain the property.”  
192 F.3d at 377.  To carry its burden, “[t]he government must do more than state, without 
documentary support, that it no longer possesses the property at issue.”  Id. at 377-78; see 
also United States v. Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Allowing the 
government to defeat a Rule 41(g) motion simply by asserting that it no longer retains 
possession of the property would frustrate the purpose of the Fed R. [Crim.] P. 41(g) 
evidentiary inquiry set forth in Chambers.”).  That standard was not satisfied here — 
instead, the District Court accepted the Government’s unsupported assertions that it either 
never had or no longer possessed Green’s property.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.1 
 However, we reject Green’s argument that the case should be remanded to a 
different District Judge.  We have emphasized that “reassignment is an extraordinary 
                                                            
1 In its brief to this Court, the Government represents that, while this appeal has been pending, the Secret Service has 
released numerous items of property to Green.  We will leave it to the District Court to determine in the first 
instance whether Green has received the items that he seeks or whether disputes remain.   
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remedy that should seldom be employed,” which will generally be appropriate only in 
cases “involv[ing] apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source, meaning 
something above and beyond judicial rulings or opinions formed in presiding over the 
case.”  United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d Cir. 2012).  Green has failed 
altogether to make this showing.
2
  See, e.g., Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
                                                            
2 Green argues that we should bar the Government from participating in this appeal because it failed to object to his 
Rule 41(g) motion.  However, his premise is wrong — the government did in fact oppose his motion, as the District 
Court’s order makes clear — and we will deny his request.   
